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Extensive cleaning or checking of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)
are often interpreted as strategies to avoid harm and as an expression of the widespread
belief that OCD patients are more risk-averse. However, despite its clinical significance,
the neural basis of risk attitude in OCD is unknown. Here, we investigated neural activity
during risk processing using functional magnetic resonance imaging and simultaneously
assessed risk attitude using a separate behavioral paradigm in OCD patients with
different symptoms versus healthy controls (HCs). We found opposite insula responses
to high versus low risk in OCD patients compared to HCs: a positive correlation
between insula activity and risk-aversion in patients versus a negative correlation in
controls. Although OCD patients overall were not more risk-averse than controls, there
were differences between subgroups of OCD patients: patients with doubt/checking
symptoms were more risk-averse than other patients. Taken together, OCD patients
show a reversed pattern of risk processing by the insula compared to HCs. Moreover,
the data suggest that increased activation of the insula signals an abnormal urge to
avoid risks in the subpopulation of OCD patients with doubt and checking symptoms.
These results indicate a role for the insula in excessive risk-avoidance relevant to OCD.
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INTRODUCTION
Risk and the need to assess risk pervade our daily life. The outcome of choices is not always certain
but different outcomes can occur probabilistically. The variance in value of these possible outcomes
is a straightforward measure of the risk involved in the decision. For instance, if the choice can lead
to either a very positive or a very negative outcome for the individual, there is a higher variance and
therefore a higher risk than if the choice can lead to a moderately positive or a moderately negative
outcome. Moreover, how the level of risk influences one’s choice differs between individuals. Some
may prefer low risk over high risk, for example because they overweigh the relative loss provided by
the worst outcome, whereas others may be drawn to choices that involve high risk. Overall, people
tend to prefer safer options, at least when the stakes are high (Pratt, 1964). This tendency toward
risk avoiding strategies may have evolved because they may have promoted survival in cases where
negative outcomes were life-threatening (Hintze et al., 2015). However, too much risk aversion may
lead to suboptimal behavior and may be related to psychopathology.
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Clinical observations and stereotypical portraits of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) in the media have led to the
common-sense belief that these patients have an abnormal
risk assessment: they perceive more risk, are more averse to
risk, and therefore develop compulsions to prevent or avoid
these perceived dangers such as contamination or harm to self
or others. This believe has resonated with scientists (Steketee
and Frost, 1994) and is in agreement with the finding that
similar brain regions are involved in risk processing and OCD:
striatum, insula, prefrontal cortex, and cingulate cortex [e.g.
OCD: (Figee et al., 2011; Jung et al., 2011; Stern et al., 2011;
Cocchi et al., 2012; Remijnse et al., 2013), risk processing
(Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008; d’Acremont and Bossaerts, 2008;
Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Mohr et al.,
2010; Holper et al., 2014)]. However, very little is known
about the role of risk attitude and its neural correlates in
OCD and available studies are inconsistent: OCD patients were
either more averse to risk and showed increased amygdala
activation after having made a risky choice (Admon et al.,
2012) or they showed no difference in the proportion of risky
choices compared to healthy controls (HCs) (Starcke et al.,
2010) or difference in risk avoidance did not explain any
difference in choice behavior between OCD patients and HCs
(Gillan et al., 2013). Additionally, OCD is a heterogeneous
disorder and it has been suggested that abnormal (i.e.,
heightened) risk perception may be more associated with
a specific subtype of OCD characterized by worry about
harm and checking compulsions (Rasmussen and Eisen, 2002).
However, the relation between risk attitude in OCD and the
underlying neural mechanisms of risk processing has never been
investigated.
In the present study we measured risk attitude and brain
activation during risk processing separately using two behavioral
paradigms that exposed participants to more or less risk and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This design
enabled us to compare behavioral and neural differences in risk
processing between groups and moreover to investigate whether
risk attitude affected neural processing of risk differently in OCD
patients compared to HCs. We hypothesize that OCD patients
will be more aversive toward risk and show abnormalities in
risk related brain regions during risk processing. In particular,
based on the central role of the insula and the lateral prefrontal
cortex in processing risk and risk attitude (Preuschoff et al., 2006;
Burke and Tobler, 2011; Holper et al., 2014), we expect to find
differences in risk-processing between patients and HCs in these
regions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 18 OCD patients were recruited at the Psychiatric
Department of the Academic Medical Center of the University
of Amsterdam and 16 control subjects were recruited from the
community. Due to a hardware problem the data from the
behavioral paradigm of three controls and one patient were lost.
Therefore, the behavioral data and regression analysis for risk
attitude and fMRI contrasts were based on 17 OCD patients and
13 control subjects. The groups were matched for age, pre-morbid
intellectual functioning (IF) and gender (see Table 1). The
diagnosis of OCD was established by a psychiatrist and confirmed
by the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan
et al., 1998; van Vliet and de Beurs, 2007) according to DSM-
IV criteria. Patients with a history of psychosis, bipolar disorder,
developmental disorder, traumatic brain injury, or substance
dependence were excluded from the study. The control group
consisted of medication-free, healthy subjects without a history of
OCD or any other psychiatric disorder. The study was approved
by the Medical Ethics Committee of the Academic Medical
Center of the University of Amsterdam and all participants gave
written informed consent.
Study Procedure
On the day of testing subjects were first assessed for clinical and
demographic data, then they conducted a computer task outside
the scanner to assess risk attitude and finally they carried out
a separate risk processing paradigm during an fMRI scanning
session.
Assessments
Clinical Characteristics
Obsessive-compulsive disorder symptoms and OCD severity
were assessed using the Yale–Brown Obsessive-Compulsive
Scale and the related symptom checklist (Y-BOCS, Y-BOCS-SC
(Goodman et al., 1989). The presence of anxiety and depression
symptoms was assessed with the Hamilton Rating Scales for
Anxiety [HAM-A (Hamilton, 1959)] and Depression [HAM-D
(Hamilton, 1960)]. Pre-morbid IF was estimated using the Dutch
version of the National Adult Reading Test [DART (Schmand
et al., 1991)]. As expected, patients showed significantly more
depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms than
controls (Table 1).
Ten patients were treated with serotonin reuptake inhibitors,
one with a tricyclic antidepressant (clomipramine) and seven
patients were unmedicated.
Measuring Risk Attitude (Outside Scanner)
Individuals differ in their choice behavior in accordance to
their risk attitude: with similar expected value, risk-averse
individuals prefer a low risk gamble over a high risk gamble.
Risk can be mathematically defined as the variance of possible
outcomes following the mean-variance approach of finance
theory (Markowitz, 1959). According to this approach, we
operationalized a low risk gamble by a smaller variance between
two outcomes of equal probability compared to a high risk
gamble. A risk-averse individual my prefer a low risk gamble,
for example, because they overweigh the relative loss provided
by the worst outcome whereas risk-seeking individuals prefer
gambles with higher risk and may overweigh the relative
gain provided by the best outcome (Christopoulos et al.,
2009).
To determine risk attitude, each participant performed a
computer task before the scanning session previously used by
(Christopoulos et al., 2009). In each trial participants were
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TABLE 1 | Demographic and clinical data of patients and healthy controls (HCs).
Total group Patients (N = 18) Controls (N = 16) Difference
Mean Range Mean Range P-value
Age (y) 34 (6.8) 23–54 36 (9.4) 22–58 0.599
Gender (M:F) 6:12 4:12 0.595
Pre-morbid IF 107 (5.4) 98–118 109 (4.9) 100–116 0.212
HAM-A 11.17 0–26 0.44 0–2 0.000
HAM-D 9.06 0–24 0.69 0–3 0.000
YBOCS 23.89 12–33 0 0 0.000
Analyzed group Patients (N = 17) Controls (N = 13) Difference
Mean Range Mean Range P-value
Age (y) 34 (7.0) 23–54 34 (8.4) 22–48 0.978
Gender (M:F) 6:11 2:11 0.222
Pre-morbid IF 107 (5.1) 100–118 108 (4.6) 100–114 0.777
HAM-A 11.82 0–26 0.38 0–2 0.000
HAM-D 9.59 2–24 0.77 0–3 0.000
YBOCS 23.47 12–33 0 0 0.000
HAM-A, Hamilton Ratings Scale for Anxiety; HAM-D, Hamilton Ratings Scale for Depression; YBOCS, Yale–Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale.
presented with a gamble (two amounts with equal probability)
and a safe alternative (one amount) that they had to choose from.
There were three blocks with three different gambles of different
risk level: 40 and 60 (low risk), 30 and 70 (medium risk), 10 and 90
(high risk), all with the same expected value of 50 and the same
probability of 0.5. In each block the gamble was kept constant
while the safe amount varied in each trial according to a staircase
method (parameter estimation by sequential testing: PEST) to
establish the safe amount for which participants were indifferent
between the gamble and safe alternative. The safe amount for
which participants were indifferent between the gamble and
safe amount is called the certainty equivalent (CE). For each
of the three gambles (low, medium, and high risk) the CE was
established. When the risk increases between the gambles a risk-
sensitive person adapts their CE. Risk-aversion is the difference
between the low risk CE minus the high risk CE and reflects
how much the individual is influenced by risk. A person with
no difference between the CE of a high and low risk gamble is
unaffected by the level of risk and is therefore called risk-neutral.
By contrast, a person is called risk seeking when the CE of the
high risk gamble is larger than the CE of the low risk gamble
and risk-averse when the inverse is true. For example, for the
low risk gamble (40 and 60), a risk-averse person may have a
CE of 45 and for the high risk gamble (10 and 90) a CE of 35,
resulting in a risk-aversion of 45–35 = 10 (Christopoulos et al.,
2009).
Risk Processing Paradigm (Inside Scanner)
We adapted a paradigm used previously (Christopoulos et al.,
2009; Tobler et al., 2009) which probes monetary risk processing
in both choice and non-choice situations. First, participants
were presented for 4.5 s with two gambles, both of which
were made up of two monetary amounts and matched for
expected value. One gamble was presented on one side and
the other on the other side of the central fixation cross and
participants were instructed to choose one of the two sides by
button press within the 4.5 s (Figure 1). The response time
(RT) (i.e., the time from the onset of the gambles until the
button press) was measured in each trial. When participants
did not respond in time they were presented with a red cross
indicating their late response and the trial was repeated. Second,
when participants responded in time, the gambles from the
first period were presented with a red rectangular around
the gamble of the chosen side for 1 s. During the intertrial
interval, which varied between 2.7 and 7.4 s, a fixation cross was
shown.
In each trial, participants had a 50% chance to win either
amount on the chosen side (i.e., one of the two components of
the chosen gamble). When, for example, 50 and 10 was shown
on the left side and 40 and 20 on the right side, choosing the left
side lead to a red rectangular around 50 and 10 on the left side
and a 50% chance of winning 50 and a 50% chance of winning
10. To control for the possibility of outcome related activation
contaminating risk-related activation and impacting subsequent
choice behavior we did not show the outcomes of each choice.
The participants were informed that at the end of the experiment,
one trial would be chosen randomly and played out to determine
their payoff in Euros.
In each choice trial, the presented monetary amounts made
up a high or a low risk gamble, such that one side was riskier
than the other. The high risk gamble was defined as 66% gain or
loss relative to the expected value, whereas the low risk gamble
consisted of a 33% gain or loss relative to the expected value. The
gambles on each side had an expected value of either 30 (i.e., the
low risk gamble had the possible outcomes of 20 and 40 whereas
the high risk gamble has the possible outcomes of 10 and 50) or
60 (i.e., possible outcomes of low risk gamble: 40 and 80; possible
outcomes of high risk gamble: 20 and 100).
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of scanner task. After viewing a fixation cross participants are presented with two gambles in the first period and choose the left
or right side. In choice trials (A,B) the gambles differ in risk, in no-choice trials (C,D) they do not. After 4.5 s the choice of participants is represented by a red square
around the chosen gamble in slide 2. Examples of trials: (A) choice trial, participant chooses low risk gamble (B) choice trial, participant chooses high risk gamble;
(C) no-choice trial, participant ‘chooses’ high risk gamble (D) no-choice trial, participant ‘chooses’ low risk gamble.
As in the original task adapted from Christopoulos et al.
(2009) we included no-choice situations to expose all participants
to both high and low risk. In no-choice situations the gambles
on both sides were exactly the same such that participants
were forced to undergo the presented risk by selecting one of
the two sides (i.e., on each side 10 and 50 or 20 and 100
for high risk and 20 and 40 or 40 and 80 for low risk). In
contrast, in choice situations participants could avoid exposure
to specific risk levels, resulting in only high risk gamble choices
(for risk seeking participants) or only low risk gamble choices
(for risk-averse participants). Indeed, in the present sample,
10 participants consistently chose only high risk or only low
risk gambles, which made it impossible to compare their high
versus low risk trials dependent on choice. We presented two
options on each side also in the no-choice trials in order to
control for visual and motor factors, i.e., in both types of
trials, choice and no-choice, there were two alternatives and
the participants needed to select the right or left alternative. In
total this resulted in 18–56 high risk trials depending on choice
behavior (i.e., participants with only low risk choices would have
18 no-choice high risk trials), and 18–56 low risk trials. We
used the presented level of risk as main independent variable
of interest to investigate risk processing in OCD patients versus
HC. The percentage of risky choices served as a proxy for risk
attitude.
Acquisition of Images and Pre-processing
Magnetic Resonance Imaging data were obtained using a 3.0 T
Intera MRI scanner (Phillips Healthcare, Best, Netherlands)
equipped with a SENSE eight-channel receiver head coil. A spin
echo-planar (EPI) sequence sensitive to blood oxygenation level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR/TE = 2300/25 ms, matrix size
96 × 96, voxel size 2.29 mm × 2.29 mm × 3 mm, 40 slices, no
gap) was used to acquire approximately 254 volumes and a high
resolution structural scan was used for anatomical reference with
EPI data.
Imaging data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,
London, UK). Functional images of each subject were corrected
for differences in slice timing, realigned, co-registered with the
structural scan, segmented for normalization to an MNI template
and resampled at 2 mm× 2 mm × 2 mm. Finally images were
smoothed using an 8 mm full width at half maximum Gaussian
kernel.
Data Analysis
Behavior
Demographical data and behavioral performance inside and
outside the scanner were analyzed using SPSS 19. Group
differences in IF and age were analyzed using independent sample
t-tests, and gender proportions were analyzed using a χ2 test.
The significance level was set at p<0.05. After confirming with
the Shapiro–Wilk test that the distributions of risk-aversion and
CE (average CE of three risky gambles) in both groups did not
significantly deviate from normality, between-group differences
were analyzed with an independent sample t-test.
RTs in the scanning task were analyzed with a mixed model
ANOVA using risk level of trial (high vs. low) as a within-
participant variable and group as a between-participant variable.
The RTs and percentages of risky choices were compared between
groups with an independent sample t-test.
Neuroimaging
At the first level, a high-pass filter (1/128 Hz) was applied
to account for low-frequency signal drift and temporal
autocorrelation was modeled as an AR(1) process. The onset of
the first period (i.e., presentation of gambles) was modeled with
a stick function. The level of risk that participants chose (high or
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low) was our independent variable of interest and we modeled
chosen risk level (high>low) as a parametric modulator for
both choice and no-choice trials. Risk level during presentation
of gambles was therefore defined by the following behavioral
choice. Specifically, we constructed a parametric modulator that
assigned a 1 to all chosen high risk trials and a −1 to all chosen
low risk trials. Note that in the no-choice trial participants were
forced to make either a high or low risk choice by choosing
from two identical options. These trials were included to expose
participants to both risk levels. Therefore in our variable of
interest choice and no-choice trials were used together. The
six realignment parameters were included to account for head
movement. Subject-specific contrasts were obtained for the
parametric modulator and entered into second-level random
effects analyses using an independent sample t-test to investigate
group differences for high > low risk.
In addition at the second-level a linear regression was
conducted to determine whether risk attitude (i.e., level of risk-
aversion per subject as measured by the behavioral task, CE
low – CE high) influences brain activation differently between
groups in the high > low risk contrast. Specifically, we used a
factorial model ANOVA to assess the risk contrast, with groups
(patient/controls) as between-subject factor and risk attitude as
subject-specific variable.
Statistical tests were corrected for multiple comparisons across
the whole brain at the cluster level (p < 0.05, family wise error
correction) using a cluster-forming threshold of p<0.01. The
figures are presented at a threshold of p<0.005 uncorrected for
visualization with the left side of the brain on the right side of the
figures.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results Outside Scanner
The data showed that the risk attitude measures were similar
for both groups: no significant difference between OCD patients
and HC in mean risk-aversion or mean risk premium during the
risk attitude assessment prior to the scanning session (p ≥ 0.25;
Table 2). In agreement with this, the ranges of risk attitudes were
similar in both groups: the highest level of risk-seeking was −15
in patients and −18 in controls while the highest level of risk-
aversion was 20 for patients and 24 for controls. These results
indicate that OCD patients are not more risk-averse than HC and
that both groups are heterogeneous and vary considerably in their
risk attitudes.
Behavioral Results Inside Scanner
In line with similar risk attitudes in both groups prior to
scanning, we also observed no significant group differences in
the percentage of high risk choices during the task in the scanner
(Table 2). Additionally we found a positive correlation at trend
significance (r = 0.292 p = 0.124) for risk aversion (measured
outside scanner) and percentage of safe choices made in choice
trials (measured inside scanner).
RTs differed between high risk versus low risk gambles with
shorter RTs for selecting the high risk gamble. This indicates that
participants respond differently to high risk compared to low
risk validating the risk manipulation. However, there were no
significant group differences or group × condition interaction
effects.
Neural Correlates of Risk Processing
We examined neural processing of risk while participants were
exposed to high versus low risk (Figure 1). No significant
main effects and no significant differences between patients and
controls were found when we compared brain activation induced
by high versus low risk. Thus, we found no indications for neural
differences in risk processing between the groups.
Effect of Risk Attitude on Risk
Processing
To test whether risk attitude affected neural processing of
risk differently across groups we performed a linear regression
analysis between risk attitude (i.e., level of risk-aversion) and the
high versus low risk fMRI contrast. This revealed an interaction
effect with group: patients showed a stronger correlation
between risk-aversion and brain activation (high risk > low
risk) than controls in the insula (T = 5.95, PFWE<0.001),
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (T = 5.99, PFWE<0.001) and pre-
and postcentral gyrus (T = 4.33, PFWE = 0.001; T = 4.23,
PFWE<0.032: Figures 2A and 3; Table 3; all statistical tests
were whole-brain cluster-level corrected). These results remained
significant after controlling for differences in anxiety and
depression scores. No significantly stronger correlations were
found for the controls compared to patients.
In order to determine the direction of the association within
groups we performed follow-up testing which showed a positive
correlation between insula activity during risk processing and
risk-aversion in patients (T= 6.11, PFWE= 0.001: Figures 2B and
3A; Table 3), and a negative correlation between risk-aversion
and activation of this region for controls (T= 5.64, PFWE= 0.047:
Figures 2B and 3B; Table 3). Patients also showed a positive
correlation between risk-aversion and activity in the DLPFC
(T = 5.57, PFWE = 0.004) and activity in the precentral gyrus
(T = 4.34, PFWE = 0.021: Table 3; Figure 2C).
These results imply that patients and controls show an
opposite pattern of insula recruitment during risk processing:
high risk situations resulted in higher insula activation in risk-
averse patients while high risk situations resulted in lower
insula activation in risk-averse HC. Moreover compared to HC,
patients showed stronger activation increases in the DLPFC and
pre/postcentral gyrus with risk-aversion during risk processing
(Table 3 and Figures 2A,C).
Post Hoc Exploration of Risk Attitude
and Clinical Data in the Patient Group
The lack of differences in risk attitude between groups
may be due to the heterogeneity of the disorder where
different subgroups of OCD show different levels of risk
attitude. To explore this hypothesis, patients were allocated
to one of five OCD symptom dimensions: (i) hoarding,
(ii) contamination/cleaning, (iii) symmetry/ordering, (iv)
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TABLE 2 | Risk attitude and behavioral results of risk processing paradigm.
Risk attitude (outside scanner) Patients (N = 17) Controls (N = 13) Difference
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P-value
Risk aversion (high-low premium) −0.59 (9.4) −15 to 20 3.46 (12.6) −18 to 24 0.32
Risk processing paradigm (inside scanner) Patients (N = 18) Controls (N = 16) Difference
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range P-value
Risky choices (%) 35.73 (32.45) 0–100 22.36 (28.89) 0–100 0.21
RT Risk ∗ Group 0.68
RT Risk 0.041
Group: RT high risk (s) 1.625 (0.23) 1.26–2.09 1.54 (0.24) 1.16–1.96 0.29
Group: RT low risk (s) 1.690 (0.29) 1.33–2.41 1.58 (0.30) 1.11–2.15 0.29
RT, reaction time; 1significant (p<0.05).
FIGURE 2 | Preferential correlations between risk-related activation and risk-aversion of patients compared to controls. (A) Stronger correlation
between risk-aversion and brain activation in high risk > low risk contrast in OCD patients compared to healthy participants in the insula, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, precentral and postcentral gyrus. (B) Patients show a positive correlation between insula activation in the high risk > low risk contrast and risk-aversion
(green) while controls show a negative correlation (blue); the red cluster reveals the comparison between groups. (C) Patients show a positive correlation between
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation in the high risk > low risk contrast and risk-aversion (green), the red cluster reveals the comparison between patients and
controls.
unacceptable/taboo thoughts (v) doubt/checking according to
the YBOCS symptoms checklist (Brakoulias et al., 2013). When
patients scored on multiple dimensions, they were assigned to
the dimension for which they reported most symptoms. We
excluded patients with predominantly hoarding symptoms,
as there is evidence that this dimension may be independent
from OCD (Pertusa et al., 2008). All seven risk-averse OCD
patients belonged to the doubt/checking subgroup, whereas
the 10 patients in the risk-seeking group consisted of three
patients with mainly unacceptable/taboo thoughts, two with
mainly symmetry/ordering symptoms, three with mainly
contamination/cleaning symptoms, and only two with mainly
doubt/checking symptoms (Supplementary Table S1). Note
that the two risk-seeking patients with mainly doubt/checking
symptoms were close to being risk-neutral. Accordingly,
risk-averse and risk-seeking patients showed a significant
difference in symptom dimension (p = 0.014). On average,
patients with doubt/checking symptoms were significantly more
risk-averse than patients with other symptoms (p<0.001), and
this remained significant after controlling for whether patients
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FIGURE 3 | Correlations between insula activation and risk-aversion. Positive correlation for (A) patients and negative correlation for (B) controls between
insula activation and risk-aversion. Blue points in (A) represent patients within doubt/checking symptom dimension.
TABLE 3 | Comparison of regression analysis between groups.
Test Direction of correlation Region Side Cluster level P value (FWE) T Cluster size MNI
X Y Z
Group comparison Patients >controls Insula R 0.000 5.95 1572 48 −14 12
DLPFC L 0.000 5.99 840 −32 28 32
Precentral gyrus L 0.001 4.33 682 −64 −30 26
Pre/postcentral gyrus L 0.032 4.23 407 −48 −4 44
Controls Negative Insula R 0.047 5.64 304 36 6 12
Patients Positive Insula R 0.001 6.11 758 48 2 −6
DLPFC L 0.004 5.57 579 −34 26 30
Precentral gyrus L 0.021 4.34 433 −64 −28 30
Comparison of regression analysis of brain activation in the high-risk > low-risk contrast against risk aversion between groups. R,right; L, left; DLPFC, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex. For overlap between different insula and DLPFC clusters see Figures 2B,C.
used medication (p = 0.001), indicating that the differences
between groups were not due to differences in medication
use.
To test whether medication use affected risk attitude or the
number of risky choices in the scanner we used an independent
sample t-test to compare medicated and unmedicated OCD
patients. We found no differences in mean risk-aversion or
percentage of risky choices in the scanner between medicated and
unmedicated OCD patients: −1.3 (10.4) vs. 0.7 (7.9) (p = 0.70);
risky choices, medicated and unmedicated patients: 39.4% (37.9)
vs. 28.3% (18.1) (p= 0.41).
DISCUSSION
Contrary to common belief, patients with OCD were not more
averse to risk than HC in the present task. Regardless, HC and
OCD patients showed an opposite correlation between risk-
aversion and insula activity during risk processing: insula activity
correlated positively with risk-aversion in patients, whereas
in HC insula activity correlated negatively with risk-aversion.
Moreover OCD patients showed stronger activation increases in
the DLPFC and pre/postcentral gyrus with risk-aversion during
risk processing.
Patients showed stronger activation in the right insula to
high versus low risk with increasing risk-aversion, whereas
controls showed stronger activation in the same region with
increasing propensity to seek risk (i.e., decreasing risk-aversion).
Growing evidence suggests that the insula is involved in
interoceptive processing (i.e., perception of internal feelings of
the body) and the evaluation of interoceptive states contributing
to subjective feelings and emotions (Craig, 2002). Additionally
neuroeconomic studies have pointed to a role of the insula
in risk processing (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Huettel,
2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Burke and Tobler, 2011). Risk
processing in humans is not only a deliberate calculation of
probability but also involves the evaluation of affective states
(Mukherjee, 2010). Taken together these findings have led to
the hypothesis that the insula is critically involved in the
affective processes underlying risk processing (Paulus et al., 2003;
Gowin et al., 2014). Additionally the insula has been related
to cognitive control and the accumulation of information in
the process of decision making possibly affecting risk taking
(Hu et al., 2014). Our data concur and raise the possibility
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that interoceptive processes may play a particularly prominent
role in the subgroup of OCD patients with doubt and checking
symptoms.
Moreover, the insula may also be involved in expressing the
affective components of risk into behavior. In agreement with
this notion, evidence suggests that activity in the insula may
be associated with an urge for risk taking in HC (Xue et al.,
2010) and in non-human species (Ishii et al., 2012) which is
in line with our finding that risk-related insula activation is
associated with risk-seeking in HC. The finding that activity
in the same region of the insula in patients is correlated
with risk-aversion may suggest that at least some parts of
the insula assume a differential role in the two groups: for
HC this subregion may bias behavior towards taking risks
whereas for OCD patients it could bias behavior towards risk
avoidance. Alternatively, in both groups the insula may signal
general arousal or decision urgency but this is experienced
more strongly by risk-averse patients and by risk-seeking
HC participants. In both cases, the insula seems to play an
important role in the integration of bodily interoceptive signals
with awareness appropriate action tendencies (i.e., approach
or avoid) in the face of high risk. The insula may play such
a role (Xue et al., 2010; Ishii et al., 2012) in an individually
adjusted manner (Paulus et al., 2003; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005).
Additionally, risk-averse OCD patients showed increased
recruitment of the DLPFC and precentral gyrus during risk
processing in contrast to HCs. This contrasts with HCs (Tobler
et al., 2009; Holper et al., 2014) and may reflect increased
collaboration between prefrontal regions and the insula when
patients process risk. The DLPFC has previously been shown
to encode the value of risk (Huettel, 2006; Christopoulos et al.,
2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Holper et al., 2014). Moreover DLPFC
has been implicated in executive functioning and specifically
cognitive control (Mohr et al., 2010). Speculatively, the increased
recruitment of this region in risk-averse OCD patients might
show additional control mechanisms in the face of risky
choices.
No differences in risk attitude were found between groups,
suggesting that in general, OCD patients are not more risk
averse than HCs. Consistent with the behavioral results no
overall neural differences were found during risk processing
between groups. A possible explanation for this lack of differences
between groups but the finding that the groups differ in
correlation between risk attitude and neural correlates is
that OCD is a heterogeneous disorder and different subtypes
of OCD show differences in risk attitude. Indeed post hoc
analyses showed that all risk-averse OCD patients expressed
doubt/checking symptoms and this subgroup was more risk-
averse than patients with other symptoms. Patients with
doubt/checking symptoms report obsessions about causing
unintentional harm to others, fear that something terrible might
happen, indecisiveness and checking compulsions. Interestingly,
the heightened risk-aversion of this group became apparent
here even in situations in which only gains could occur. The
finding that risk-aversion may contribute to only a specific
subtype of OCD suggests that for this group addressing
abnormal risk-assessment in cognitive behavioral therapy may be
helpful.
Several limitations are worth mentioning. One potential
limitation of our study was the relatively strong behavioral
consistency of our subjects, which made it impossible to
investigate potential interactions between risk and choice.
Additionally, in the paradigm used in this study, risk arose from
the variance of money that could be earned while there was
no risk of losing money. Therefore risk-aversion was not based
on loss prevention but on a preference for more certainty in
gain. In a pure gain context, risk-aversion could result from
perceiving the lowest possible outcome as relative loss or from
perceiving more variance. OCD patients may have different
neural responses during actual loss versus reward anticipation
(Choi et al., 2012) and including losses could have affected
risky choices in OCD irrespective of symptoms. However, a
previous study (Gillan et al., 2013) using both gains and losses
nevertheless confirmed our result that on average risk processing
is unaffected in OCD. A further limitation could be that the
range between risk-seeking and risk-averse extremes was higher
in both the OCD and HC group than expected based on a
previous study using a similar task (Christopoulos et al., 2009).
This increased variance in risk attitude may be due to the
heterogeneity of our group in terms of age and IF compared
to the group of primarily college students used in the previous
study.
Another potential limitation is the fact that 10 patients
were using serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SRIs) and one patient
was using a tricyclic antidepressant whereas 7 other patients
did not receive medication. Serotonin neurotransmission is
correlated with successful withholding of responses and risk
avoidance, whereas low serotonin promotes early responding
and risk taking (Cools et al., 2008; Long et al., 2009). In
the present study we did not find any differences in risk-
aversion or propensity for risky choice between medicated
and unmedicated patients and differences in risk-aversion
between patients with doubt/checking symptoms and other
patients remained significant after controlling for medication
use. Therefore it seems unlikely that in our study SRI
medication explains the risk profiles of patients. However,
for comparisons within the OCD group the sample size
is small and this has to be taken into account when
interpreting the differences between risk-averse and risk-seeking
patients.
In conclusion, we found elevated insula activation during
risk processing in risk-averse OCD patients, which may suggest
that the insula is involved in an increased urge to avoid risk
in these patients. Increased avoidance signaling in the insula
might contribute to the development of risk-avoidant strategies
in this group, which in turn could lead to persistence of the
disorder.
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